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THE LEFT, THE RIGHT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: 1918-1928*
ROBERT

M. COVER**

The Supreme Court of the United States has long been more than a
forum of last resort, an ultimate tribunal for resolving disputes. At least
since its decision in Marbury v. Madison' in 1803 it also has been the
political philosopher or, if one prefers a more pejorative connotation, the
.ideologue of the American democracy. 2 Constitutional law in the United
* This article was delivered as the Simon E. Sobeloff Lecture at the University of
Maryland Law School, May 1, 1980. I am deeply grateful to the Dean, faculty, students
and alumni of the University of Maryland Law School and to the family of the late Judge
Sobeloff for the opportunity to present this lecture. The memory of Judge Sobeloff is most
honored in the works of justice that he wrought, but I hope it may be honored as well with
this article dedicated to it.
** Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to the Harvard Law School and
to Professors Paul Freund and Grant Gilmore for permission to use and quote from the
Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. manuscript collections. I am particularly
grateful to Mrs. Erika Chadbourn, the Curator of those collections, for her generous
assistance throughout the research for this article. All quotations from the Holmes and
Brandeis papers are with the permission of the Harvard Law School. I wish to thank
Bruce Ackerman, Marvin Chirelstein, Jan Deutsch, Owen Fiss, Paul Freund, Julius
Getman, Joe Goldstein, Grant Gilmore, Arthur Leff and Peter Schuck for reading and
commenting upon drafts of this paper.
1. 1 Cranch 137 (1803). While it is the section of Marbury devoted to judicial review
that is most often read and analyzed, I am referring here to the earlier portions of the
opinion devoted to the reach of "law" in circumscribing the activities of executive officers.
Id. at 169-173.
2. I will use the term "ideology" because it denotes several salient characteristics of
the Court's work. First, it suggests a comprehensive justificatory or apologetic intellectual
enterprise. The Court is so engaged. Its job is either to undo the decisions affecting other
persons and institutions in society or to explain why they shall stand. Its apologetic
explanations, moreover, are rarely straightforward statements that the result is right.
Rather, they are ordinarily explanations that since the allocation of political or economic
power is, as a whole and systematically, just, it is appropriate to locate the decisional
power where it happens to lie. Such systemic justifications trump claims of particular or
local injustice with constitutional, structural and comprehensive perspectives on the
legitimacy of the order.
A second sense in which I believe the term "ideology" is appropriate to the work
of the Court is in its denotation of thought which is socially determined - a function of

(349)
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States has been and continues to be the line at which the plane of
political ideas meets that of political action. In constitutional law our
political, economic and social activity must find acceptable justifications
within our political philosophy while our ideas and ideals are tested and
changed as they meet the realities of our practical life. It usually falls to
the Supreme Court, in the final analysis, to make the formal judgments
that legitimate our activity or render it illegitimate; that express and
modify our ideas to the forms that will command collective efforts at
realization. The Court is by no means the only actor in the drama of
giving life to political ideas. But the Court, by virtue of judicial review,
stands prepared to answer any challenge as to whether a given outcome
or activity is consistent with the ultimate governing political norm, and
it must explain its conclusion. The result - constitutional law - is an
enormous series of statements as to what are or are not the implications
3
of the central principles of our politics.
Through history, very different political issues and ideas have
claimed the Court's attention. Some have been specific, transitory in
character. Others have remained, with variations, the constant dilemmas of our political experience. Because America has always seen
political democracy -

popular government -

as her most distinctive

characteristic, it has remained a constant theme for the Court. Any
justification or critique of American institutions and of their consequences requires at least an implicit theory of popular government. Such a
theory is not an academic exercise, however. It will be set against its
threatening alternatives. At the earliest stages of American government the ideology of democracy evolved against the antitheses of
monarchy and empire.4 Through the early nineteenth century competing theories of popular government played their roles in America's
internal dialectic between industrial capitalism and slavery.5 In the
the place of a social group within the social or economic structure. While I fully intend to
suggest these two dimensions of "ideology" in my use of the term I would caution against
reading other elements into it. I do not mean to suggest a Marxist taxonomy of the
relevant social groups which might generate ideologies. Nor do I mean to suggest that the
systems of thought so labelled are to be compared unfavorably to some "truer" vision of
the world. In short, I use the term as part of a liberal and relativistic "sociology of

knowledge." See, e.g., R.

MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

456-89 (rev. ed.

1965).
3. The function of ideology is, in the words of Clifford Geertz, "to make an
autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it

meaningful." C. GEERTZ, Ideology as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 218 (1973). And see IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 18 (D. Apter ed. 1964).
4. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969).
5. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN, ROLL (1974); W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM

IN AMERICA

1760-1848 (1977).
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later nineteenth century and in the first twenty years of the twentieth
century, the Court had to face the practical and conceptual challenges of
adapting democratic processes and forms to an industrializing nation
with its attendant class conflicts and dislocations. 6 In the wake of World
War I, the focal period for this article, the conceptual challenge to
democratic theory ceased to be primarily internal. With the political
collapse of Europe, the Wilsonian program for peace, the struggle over
the League of Nations and, finally and most important, the Russian
Revolution and the rise of fascism, American "democracy" became a
principal contender for ideological ascendancy in a global struggle for
ideas and power. 7 The challenges wrought by industrialization, urbanization and immigration did not disappear but rather took on new and
more far reaching implications in the context of worldwide ideological
strife. The Supreme Court played a major role in these crucial post-war
years in articulating what it was that American democracy stood for
and what it required in that conflict.'
The Court did not set its own ideological agenda. It was Wilson at
the peace table and Lenin in the wings who initially determined the
shape of the coming war of ideas. From Versailles on, the fate of
democratic institutions in Europe - buffeted by the challenges of
fascism and communism - reverberated in America. Any useful
account of American democratic theory had to take account of the
"pathologies" in the European collapse of parliamentary governments.
It became the task of American constitutional law to respond to these
pathologies. The response had to occur on two levels. On the ideological
level, it was necessary to mark the distinctions between the American
variant of capitalist democracy and the foreign political pathologies to reaffirm the distinct American mission and experiences and to
describe them. On a practical level, it became necessary to delineate an
effective defense to the political pathogens. For while Europe was
clearly marked as the source of the disease, the very nature of the
6. See, e.g., A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1969); G. WIEBE,
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (1967).
7. For different perspectives on the global ideological struggles, see, e.g., A. MAYER,
WILSON V. LENIN, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW DIPLOMACY, 1917-1918 (1959); A. MAYER,
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PEACEMAKING IN EUROPE (1967); A. MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF
COUNTERREVOLUTION IN EUROPE, 1870-1956 (1971). And see H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION
(1963); H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951); C. MAIER, RECASTING
BOURGEOIS EUROPE (1975); E. NOLTE, THE THREE FACES OF FASCISM (1965).
8. See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, PILLAR OF THE LAW 512-15 (1956)
(concerning the international context for the famous footnote 4 of United States v.

Carolene Products Corp., 304 U.S. 144 at 152-53 (1938)); Cover, Origins of Judicial
Activism in the Protection of Minorities (forthcoming in a publication of the American
Enterprise Institute on Activist Judiciary).
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struggle - its articulation in the transnational terms of class or race
warfare - was that of a potential civil war.
A full account of the work of the Court in these respects, in
distinguishing the American experience and defending against its
enemies, necessarily would become a book-length treatise. It is possible
to begin, however, with a single, critical problem, drastically in need of
reappraisal in light of the contextual considerations noted above. That
area is freedom of expression. The legal rubric corresponds to a far more
complex problem of political theory: the role of information and
advocacy in democratic government. In order to see the Court's work in
perspective, however, we shall have to examine not only conventional
free speech cases, but also a variety of other doctrines through which
the Court approached the challenge. In the first two sections of this
article I shall examine the two kinds of challenge to liberal democracy.
First I shall consider the problem of insurgency - of disorderly politics.
Next I shall consider the problem of ideology and interest in political
communication. Finally, in the last section, I shall consider one
distinctive answer to these problems in the commitment to deliberative
politics that emerged in the free speech opinions of Holmes and,
especially, Brandeis between 1919 and 1927.
MASS POLITICS OF INSURGENCY: CONSENSUS OF
A CONSERVATIVE COURT

Our conventional constitutional histories of the interbellum period
describe a great cleavage in the Court. There is a conservative old
guard, dedicated to laissez-faire, to substantive due process, to antiradical repression. It consists of White, McKenna, McReynolds, Van
Devanter, Pitney, Day, Taft, Sutherland, Butler and Sanford. This old
guard is a decisive majority of the Court throughout the period from
World War I to 1930. 9 The opposing, "liberal" block is against the
constitutionalization of any particular social or economic philosophy that is, it is against substantive due process; it is for judicial restraint,
but also for enforcement of civil liberties and civil rights as checks
against the tyranny of majorities. The liberal block consists at first only
of Holmes and Brandeis, later joined by Stone.
The traditional story is substantially accurate as far as it goes. But
it misses an essential point. It obscures the extraordinary area of

9. See, e.g., A.

TAFTr TO WARREN (1958); R.
(1941). And see Dean Acheson's
interesting individual portraits of the Justices of the Court in 1920-21, inMORNING AND
JACKSON, THE

MASON,

STRUGGLE FOR

NOON 59-77 (1965).

THE SUPREME
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consensus on the Court on major issues and the ways in which both the
area of agreement and the area of dispute performed important symbolic
functions in a larger war of ideas.
For the conservatives, the disorderly politics of the street that
emerged in the wake of war in Europe and America were a primary
threat not only to property but to civil society. William Howard Taft's
evolution is instructive. When the February Revolution occurred in
Russia, former President Taft, then law professor at Yale, pronounced:
"The end of absolutism in Russia is the first great triumph of this
war." 10 He foresaw that Russia "under the influence of civil liberty will
blossom into a leading .

.

. progressive member of the family of

nations."' 1 Two years later, in June 1919, Taft was no longer sanguine
about Russia; he was concerned about the spread of Bolshevism, but
comforted himself and his audience by observing that "the great body of
our workingmen are utterly opposed to Bolshevism."' 12 He admonished
his audience to reform industrial relations with the recognition of
unions and with collective bargaining (though not necessarily with
collective agreements) so as "to retain3 them [workingmen] and keep
them out of the hands of extremists."'
Five months later Taft had declared that Bolshevism had a foothold
in unions and was behind many of the strikes that had broken out. He
was no longer prepared even to count the destruction of old orders as
"triumphs" of the war:
The result of this war in destroying the old Governments, in
shaking of society in every country in which the war had any
influence, has been to weaken the supremacy of lawful authority.
This Bolshevism is militant and threatening in every European
country. It has penetrated to this country. Because of the presence
of hordes of ignorant European foreigners, not citizens . . .with

little or no knowledge of our language, with no appreciation of
American civilization or American institutions of civil liberty, it
has taken strong hold in many of our congested centers and is the
backing of a good many of the strikes from which our whole
community is suffering today." 4
10. New York Times, Mar. 28, 1917, at 2, col. 6.
11. Id.
12. New York Times, June 21, 1919, at 6, col. 4. Already in 1918 Taft had called for
intervention against Bolshevism. See A. MAYER, POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PEACEMAKING
261 (1967).
13. New York Times, June 21, 1919, at 6, col. 4.
14. New York Times, Oct. 31, 1919, at 3, col. 1. It must be conceded that the
extravagant rhetoric of this speech may be partially attributed to its context. It was a
"stump" speech for the reelection of Governor Calvin Coolidge.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 40

When Taft became Chief Justice, less than two years later, his first
significant opinions were attempts to impose law and civility upon labor
disputes.' 5 He genuinely believed that militant confrontation in a labor
dispute was a test of government's readiness to restrain private
violence, of its will to tame the passion of the mob, of its capacity to
impose civil forms upon private conflict. It was Taft's vision that lawful
authority had failed in Europe, that militancy, coercion, and violence
from the left had precipitated that failure. Taft, like all of us,6
undoubtedly found in history the lessons he was predisposed to learn.'
But his predisposition should not obscure the genuine commitment of
Taft and his conservative brethren to order, to public civility, and to the
elimination of private organized violence. This commitment to civility
was the mark of traditional conservatism. It eschewed alliance with the
insurgent right and, after 1919, avoided the excesses of its rhetoric.
The commitment to civil order was more than a sword to be used
against labor and the left, although that was its most obvious and
frequent manifestation. It could and would carry with it the seed for
striking against mass politics of the right as well. The dedication of the
conservative wing of the Court to the elimination of private violence
was most evident in its insistence upon the labor injunction as a
remedy; 1 7 in its strained, anti-labor reading of the Clayton Act;' 8 in its
application of the Sherman Act to secondary boycotts; 19 in short, in its
arming federal courts in order to stop picketing and organization work by
unions. But after 1919 these same conservatives were prepared to
acquiesce in some parallel restraints against the radical right. It is no

15. Taft's first labor opinion, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), was only the third opinion delivered by Taft. The first two
were a patent infringement case of no doctrinal significance, Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257
U.S. 27 (1921), and a case involving interpretation of the Rules Conformity Act as applied
to federal court execution of a judgment upon stock, Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v.
Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10 (1921). Steel Foundries is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 33-39 infra. Taft's opinion in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), was handed
down one week after Steel Foundries and was only his fourth opinion as a Justice. For a
discussion of Truax, see text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
16. _Taft'slong standing anti-labor sentiments have always been appreciated by
historians and biographers. See e.g., I. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS, ch. 4, Labor v. the Law
(1960); H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, (1939); Mason, The
Labor Decisions of Chief Justice Taft, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 585-625 (1930).
17. This insistence is most prominently displayed in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
(1921).
18. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
19. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (Coronado II); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assoc., 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
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coincidence that a year after deciding Truax v. Corrigan,20 the Court's
most explicit and unequivocal statement of the need for the labor
injunction, the Court, in Moore v. Dempsey,2 1 implicitly overruled the
recent precedent of Frank v. Mangum,22 and empowered federal courts
in habeas corpus cases to pierce the record and determine independently
of the state court whether a state trial was dominated by a mob.
Moore v. Dempsey involved an explosive confrontation between a
black community organizing itself against economic domination by
whites and a violent white effort at suppression led by the American
Legion. 23 While it was the "liberal," Holmes, the dissenter in Frank v.
Mangum, who wrote for the majority in Moore, it was Taft who joined
him and helped constitute the majority, and who assigned the opinion to
the dissenter in Frank.2 4
20. 257 U.S. 312 (1921), decided December 19, 1921.
21. 261 U.S. 86 (1923), decided February 19, 1923.
22. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). In Moore, Holmes mentions but does not explicitly overrule
Frank; nor does he offer any distinguishing facts. Justice McReynolds, dissenting in
Moore, correctly maintains that Frank is indistinguishable. 261 U.S. at 93-96 (quoting
Frank at length).
23. See Holmes's statement of the case, 261 U.S. at 87-90. See the text of the Legion's
Resolution in McReynold's dissent, id. at 99-100 n.1. An interesting account of the events
leading to Moore v. Dempsey is to be found in A. WASKOW, FROM RACE RIOT TO SIT-IN, 1919
AND THE

1960's at 143-74 (1966).

24. I do not have direct evidence of Taft's influence in the turn-around. The following
personnel changes occurred between 1915 and 1923: Taft replaced White as Chief Justice;
White had been in the Frank majority. Sanford replaced Pitney; Pitney wrote for the
majority in Frank. Brandeis replaced Lamar; Lamar joined the majority in Frank. Butler
replaced Day, who had been in the Frank majority. Sutherland sat in the chair formerly
occupied by Hughes; Hughes had dissented with Holmes in Frank while Sutherland
dissented with McReynolds in Moore. In short, Holmes and McReynolds remained
consistent and were on opposite sides in both Frank and Moore. Van Devanter and
McKenna "switched." Both of these Justices, but especially Van Devanter, were close to
Taft and were more likely to have been influenced by him than by any one else. Moreover,
the case was the subject of an unusual degree of concern between Taft and Van Devanter.
There is relatively little surviving correspondence between Taft and Van Devanter
relating to cases in which neither of them wrote opinions. One exception is a note relating
to Moore v. Dempsey. Taft wrote to Van Devanter on Feb. 13, 1923:
[I] . . . can hardly reach here before Friday afternoon and too late for a conference
with you and McR[eynolds] about Holmes's opinion in the Arkansas habeas corpus
case. I enclose my copy with my endorsement and suggestions. It is difficult for me to
make suggestions for I would have written the opinion in a different way and would
have dwelt more on our hesitation at interfering with the State Court's decision and
the State rule that subsequently discovered evidence is not receivable as a basis for a
rehearing etc. But I doubt whether the opinion as now framed will make an
uncomfortable precedent. No state officers will [now?] again be fools enough to let the
defendants make an uncontestable case by affidavits and then demur. When you and
McR. shall have conferred, forward my copy to Holmes. If you conclude to make
further suggestions, hold it until Monday afternoon and let me know what you agree
upon.
William Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter, Van Devanter papers, Library of Congress.
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The decision in Moore may appear to be a small and indirect step in
taming the right by contrast with the powerful and direct use of the
labor injunction against the left. But in America, mass movements of
the right have characteristically had strong bases in local and state
politics where they have often controlled or constituted the governing
elites. The objective of taming the mass politics of the right has
necessarily carried with it the task of penetrating the shields of
federalism. 2 5 Moore v. Dempsey did just that. It was the first major
doctrinal step since reconstruction in expanding the role of national
administration of justice in the supervision of local autonomy. 26 It
marked an outer boundary to what Legion - and Klan - dominated
communities might do, and it gave comfort, ideological support, and a
small bargaining chip to the opponents of these rightist movements.
Moreover, the decision in Moore v. Dempsey may have had more than a
passing connection with one of the great legislative constitutional
questions of the 1920's, the constitutionality of federal anti-lynching
legislation. In 1922, antilynching legislation, the Dyer Bill, was
introduced and passed the House by a resounding 230-119 vote. A
filibuster defeated the bill in the Senate, but in the words of the

This note is consistent with the view that Taft undertook to persuade a reluctant Van
Devanter to go along in Moore by claiming that the reach of the opinion would be quite
limited. It is, of course, possible that Taft in fact thought the impact of the decision would
be very small. What is clear is that the case was of more than routine significance to the
conservatives and that Taft was actively involved in shaping the majority. Sanford and
Butler from among the new Justices to the Court were clearly within Taft's rather than
Holmes's or Brandeis's circle of influence.
Changes in the political composition of the Court do not seem likely to have been
as significant as Taft's influence. It is true that White and Lamar were both Southern
Democrats and were replaced respectively by "Mr. Republican," Taft, and by the Northern
liberal Democrat, Brandeis. However, Butler was a conservative Democrat, replacing the
Republican Day. Moreover, one must still account for the switch of McKenna and Van
Devanter. The most plausible case against Taft's influence is a specific statement, which
Frankfurter ascribed to Brandeis, that the Court had changed between Frank and Moore.
If personnel changes could account for a 5-4 split in favor of the turnaround, Van
Devanter and McKenna might have switched to avoid the politically loaded appearance of
significant 5-4 decisions on constitutional matters. Senator Borah had proposed requiring
7-2 majorities for declaring statutes unconstitutional and some justices reacted by
occasionally joining narrow majorities with which they disagreed. See, BrandeisFrankfurter Conversations, Brandeis Papers (Harvard Law School Library).

25. See the analysis of the administration of justice in G.

MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN

(1944), where the author concludes that the popular political character of local
administration in America "turns out ...
to be the greatest menace to legal democracy
when it is based on restricted political participation and an ingrained tradition of caste
suppression." Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted).
26. One might argue that cases long antedating Moore deserve primacy of place. See,
e.g., Carter v. Texas 177 U.S. 442 (1900). But such cases did not create a mechanism for
systematic oversight and development of the national administration of justice.
DILEMMA
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standard treatise on southern history for this period, "the agitation
continued until 1925. .. .
The Court thus spoke to the issue of the
constitutional implications of a mob-dominated trial precisely at the
time that mob justice was a critical politico-constitutional question
before Congress. If the Court had reaffirmed Frank v. Mangum it would
have surely provided major ammunition to the argument that federal
antilynching legislation would be unconstitutional. It is likely that Taft,
by far the most able, articulate and principled of the traditional
28
conservatives on the Court, was behind the shift from Frank to Moore.
We know that in 1919 Taft had been one of several prominent
Republicans who, at the request of the NAACP, petitioned senators for
an investigation of lynching and race riots.2 9
It must also be noted that when state government did act directly
against the mass movements of the right, the Taft Court was as willing
to legitimate such acts of political repression as those directed at the
left. In New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,3 ° the Supreme Court
upheld a New York Klan registration statute just a year after upholding

27. G. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South 174 (1967). A thorough discussion of
the Dyer Bill and its aftermath is to be found in R. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE
AGAINST LYNCHING 1909-1960 (1980), Chapters 2 and 3. The constitutionality of the bill
was a major concern in the Senate. For an account of the Senate's consideration of the Bill
see R. ZANGRANDO, supra at 64-71. Moore, decided a few months after the fatal filibuster
was subsequently cited by advocates of the Bill to support its constitutionality. See, e.g.,
the testimony of James Weldon Johnson before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1926:
"We are the more confident that the court will find this bill constitutional in view of
its very recent pronouncement in the case of Moore v. Dempsey decided Feb. 19, 1923.
. . . The implications of this decision are of significance in connection with such
legislation as is proposed herewith, because in such a case the United States Supreme
Court examines into the State court trial, and, regardless of the approval of that trial
by the State court of appeal, determines for itself whether or not the proceedings were
dominated by the mob, so as to make good to them the constitutional guaranty under
the fourteenth amendment that the State shall not deprive them of life or liberty
without due process of law.
In analogous fashion the present bill will, we confidently believe, be upheld as
appropriate legislation to make good the guaranty of the fourteenth amendment to
those who suffer from the unequal administration of the State laws, which now fail to
protect them from the lynching mobs. Such an appeal to this legislative body, which
represents all the people of this country and which is commanded by the highest law
of the land to see that none of them is denied the equal protection of the laws of the
States, must not fall on deaf ears."
"To Prevent and Punish the Crime of Lynching," Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 69th Cong. 1st. Sess., 36 (1926).
28. See note 24 supra.
29. A. WASKOW, supra note 23, at 205.
30. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
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California's criminal syndicalism law. 3 ' In upholding the classification
by which New York required the Klan to register its members but
exempted "benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities,"
Van Devanter wrote:
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as
was readily available, including the published report of a hearing
before a committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th
Congress (1921) relating to the formation, purposes and activities of
the Ku Klux Klan. If so, it was advised - putting aside
controverted evidence - that . . .its membership was limited to
native born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and
full adherence to the Constitution of the United States, in another
exacted of its members an oath to shield and preserve "white
supremacy," and in still another declared any person actively
opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body
politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth"; that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews and Negroes and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices; that it was striving for political power and assuming a
sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and
national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands
the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes.
We think it plain that the action of the courts below in holding
that there was a real and substantial basis for the distinction made
between the two sets of associations or orders was right and should
not be disturbed.32
Just as the traditional conservatives on the Court were willing though not eager - to act against the violence and disorder of the right,
and more important to see it condemned as a threat to public values and
civility, so the so-called liberals on the Court were prepared to acquiesce
in the suppression and condemnation of uncivil politics of labor and the
left.
The contours of the conservative consensus concerning street
politics and the willingness of Holmes and Brandeis to acquiesce in
31. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). It is interesting that Bryant elicited
no dissents or concurrences from Brandeis, Holmes or Stone. The only separate opinion is
one by McReynolds arguing that the writ of error should have been dismissed on the
ground that the record failed to disclose the federal issue decided below. 278 U.S. at 77.
Van Devanter's majority opinion in Bryant does not cite Whitney, though like the majority
in Whitney it relies upon the reasonableness of legislative findings that the targeted class
of organizations is distinctively noxious. 278 U.S. at 75. See 274 U.S. at 370-72.
32. 278 U.S. at 76-77 (footnotes omitted).
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putting down such militancy are both visible in American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,33 decided in late 1921.
That case was an important application and interpretation of section 20
of the Clayton Act, which forbids restraining orders and injunctions in
actions between employees and employers "unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property or to a property right." Taft's opinion for
the majority elicited the substantial acquiescence of every justice save
Clarke. Holmes, writing to Laski of the case, thought Taft had
admirably united the Court in his opinion. 34 What were the terms of
this consensus? First, Taft conceded the legitimacy of unions, of their
organization and of their objectives. But he read the Clayton Act as
protecting only the most civil, deliberative of processes of communication in carrying out those legitimate functions. He wrote: "The name
'picket' indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable
persuasion. 3 5 Methods of persuasion which lead to intimidation or
coercion must be restrained.
"How far may men go in persuasion and communication and still
not violate the right of those whom they would influence?" asks Taft.3 6
If an "offer . . .to communicate and discuss information" is declined,
"then persistence, importunity, following and dogging becomes unjus37
tifiable annoyance . . . which is likely soon to savor of intimidation.,
When picket lines are formed, "[a]ll information tendered, all arguments advanced and all persuasion used under such circumstances [are]
intimidation. . . The number of the pickets in the groups [4-12]
constituted intimidation. . . . When one or more assaults or disturbances ensued, they characterized the whole campaign, which became
effective because of its intimidation character." 38 As a general rule, Taft
called for the "chancellor" to make a judgment, the objective being "to
prevent the inevitable intimidation of the presence of groups of pickets,
39
but to allow missionaries."
This, then was the nature of the consensus: a communication of
labor's message was protected by the Clayton Act, but courts could and
should, under the Act, prohibit the politics of the street. Picketing as a
show of strength or feeling was not protected, although the message

33. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).

34. Letter from Holmes to Laski (Dec. 22, 1921), I.
Howe ed. 1953).
35. 257 U.S. at 205.
36. Id. at 204.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 205.
39. Id. at 207.
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might be. Of course, the opinion says nothing of constitutional rights of
expression. It is the Clayton Act that is being interpreted.
While Steel Foundries is a particularly striking statement by the
Court, demonstrating that industrial disputes do not justify breaching
the ordinary civil forms of deliberative intercourse, it is by no means the
only or even the clearest evidence of the acquiescence of Holmes and
Brandeis in that principle. Brandeis, surely the Justice on the Court
most sympathetic to labor prior to 1937, was prepared to condemn in no
uncertain terms coercive or violent behavior on the part of labor.
Perhaps because he strongly opposed the use of injunctions against the
improprieties of labor, he was prepared to see the full force of the
40
criminal law visited upon the perpetrators of violence or intimidation
and the full measure of civil damages exacted from the union. 4 1 Most
important, he was prepared to go to great rhetorical lengths to impress
upon the public that the injustice and even immorality of the extant
industrial order did not justify labor's resort to lawlessness. While
Brandeis left no doubt of his sympathies in an unpublished draft dissent
for United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., there is similarly no
doubt that he truly intended his conclusion when he wrote: "It may be
morally wrong to use legal processes, great financial resources and a
high intelligence to lower miners' standards of living; but so long as the
42
law sanctions it, economic force may not be repelled by physical force."
Civil conduct, formal legality and institutional public deliberation,
rather than direct action, are to be the forms of popular government.
Brandeis, of course, was far more prepared than was Taft to see the law
permit labor's behavior to be governed by self-interest. But he was also
prepared, as a policy matter, for the community's balance to be struck
where deemed best by the legislature, and to have the balance enforced
at that point as a matter of obedience to law! Consider Duplex Printing

40. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926). "And [the legislature] may subject to
punishment him who uses the power or influence incident to his office in a union to order
the [illegally coercive] strike. Neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment,
confers the absolute right to strike." Id. at 311.
41. Brandeis joined the opinion of the Court in United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), holding unions suable as entities in federal court. Moreover,
we know that he agreed fully with that part of the decision holding unions suable. In a
letter to Felix Frankfurter dated August 31, 1922, Brandeis wrote that it was neither new
law nor bad policy to hold unions to be an "entity" and, like virtually all entities, without
general immunity for its wrongs. V LETTERS OF Louis BRANDEIS 56-59 (M. Urofsky and D.
Levy eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as V. BRANDEIS LETTERS]. See also A. BICKEL, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 77-99 (1957) for an account of Brandeis's
initial "dissent" in Coronado,a "dissent" which was not published when Taft swung the
Court to Brandeis's position on the substantive question of Sherman Act liability.
42. BICKEL, supra note 41, at 88.

19811

THE FIRsT AMENDMENT

Press Co. v. Deering.43 In that case the Court read the Clayton Act as
permitting the enjoining of a secondary boycott which had inhibited the
complainant's interstate business. Mr. Justice Pitney's directive to the
lower court included the statement that defendants should be enjoined
from using any force, threats, command, direction, or even persuasion with the object or having the effect of causing any person...
to decline employment, cease employment, or not seek employment,
or to refrain from work or cease working under any person, firm, or
corporation being a purchaser or prospective purchaser of any
printing press or presses from complainant."
Brandeis's opinion is a most emphatic dissent about the proper reading
of the Clayton Act. Yet he concludes:
Because I have come to the conclusion that both the common law of
a State and a statute of the United States declare the right of
industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the
justification of self-interest, I do not wish to be understood as
attaching any constitutional or moral sanction to that right. All
rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which they
exist; above all rights rises duty to the community. The conditions
developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it cannot
continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is
not for judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it
their function to set the limits of permissible contest and to declare
the duties which the new situation demands. This is the function of
the legislature which, while limiting individual and group rights of
aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice for the
more primitive method of trial by combat."
Duplex amply demonstrates to what extent Brandeis and the
conservatives differed on the terms and tactics to be used in securing
order. And, of course, such differences did reflect divergent ideological
and political commitments as surely as different articulations of the
"fundamental principle" to be applied. But one of the ways in which
American politics did, indeed, differ from those of Europe in the
interbellum period was in the strength of a traditional,non-insurgent
conservatism which elevated publicly secured order, formal legality and
institutional solutions above the substance of desired ends. I am

43. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Note Brandeis's opinion. Id. at 479.
44. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
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certainly prepared to concede that, unlike their European counterparts,
American traditional conservatives were not sorely tempted to ally with
the mass movement of the right, the Klan and the Legion, for they were
by and large successful in retaining privilege and power through the
twenties without such an alliance. And the purpose of my article is not
to praise the Tafts of our world but to understand their significance. 46
Amidst conditions dictating non-alliance with the insurgent right, the
Taft conservatives and Brandeis liberals alike participated in the
elaboration of a theory of popular government and public order, a theory
characterized by a supposed general participation in deliberative
political processes and the preservation of order as a precondition to the
functioning of those processes. The most apparent difference between
these two groups lay in their readiness or reluctance to elevate the
deliberation of the legislature above that of the courts.
In Truax v. Corrigan,4' decided only a week after Steel Foundries,
that difference split the Court. The issue in Traux was whether it was
constitutional for the State of Arizona to deny the remedy of injunction
in labor disputes.48 In essence, the kind of gloss that Taft had put on the
anti-injunction provision of the Clayton Act in Steel Foundries was not
read into the Arizona statute by the Arizona Supreme Court. 49 The
United States Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Taft, held that
the Arizona law as so construed was unconstitutional. Truax v. Corrigan
thus constitutionalized the requirement of civil order in industrial
disputes and enshrined the chancellor as the constitutionally prescribed
guarantor of that order.

46. Arno Mayer writes of traditional conservatives:
In ordinary times conservatives can afford to be purely practical and empirical in
defense of the established order, while claiming special credit for being antidoctrinaire and above partisan politics. In times of crisis, however, the logic of their
position forces them into joining, condoning, or supporting those advocating an
anti-revolutionary prophylaxis that is both ideological and aggressive.

A.

MAYER, DYNAMICS OF COUNTERREVOLUTION IN EUROPE, 1870-1956, at 55 (1971). While I

am inclined to agree with Mayer's conclusion here, it seems to need some qualification. I
would have supposed that there were a range of intermediately threatening conditions
under which different conservative elites might be expected to act differently. Their
responses might depend on the extent of strength and legitimacy within the old order; the
degree to which an intelligentsia has marshalled a strong challenge to the elite's
self-perception as necessary and just; the possibility of co-opting some of the insurgent
forces. If such a qualification is advanced, the success of a Court such as the Taft Court in
framing its ideology of order may play a part in the future role of conservatives in crisis
circumstances.
47. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
48. Id. at 330.
49. Id. at 328.
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Holmes, Pitney (joined by Clarke) and Brandeis wrote dissents. All
three dissenting opinions stressed the legitimacy of a legislatively
determined balance drawn between conflicting forces in industrial
strife. The kind and degree of order to be enforced by the judiciary
5°
should be the product, not the prerequisite, of legislation.
Truax and Steel Foundries thus expose the consensus and its
limited nature. By consensus, legal imposition of civic order on the
streets was a laudable, desirable achievement. The terms of that order
were fairly understood to be the product of a legislative determination
and the Court would be quick to enforce it even if the disorder was part
of a struggle against an unjust economic system. By contrast, the
constitutional obligation to impose civic order in defense of existing
economic relations, regardless of legislative judgments to the contrary,
remained a subject dividing the Court. For Taft and the conservatives
the primacy of the concept of order required that the streets not be the
locus of decision, even if the legislature chose to lodge it there. For
Holmes and Brandeis (Pitney and Clarke would leave the Court within
a year), the ultimate objective was not order itself, but, as we shall see,
the order necessary to achieve the deliberative politics of popular
government. Where the deliberative processes of popular government
themselves determined that the community could tolerate and perhaps
benefit from a sphere of street conflict, then, they concluded, such
decisions should stand.
THE CRISIS IN THE POLITICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

I should like to turn now from the politics of the streets to that of
the libraries. In confronting the uncivil challenge of insurgency, both
from the left and the right, the Court treated the problem as one of
public order. Freedom of expression was not mentioned. The limited
consensus emerged on the critical issue of suppressing street politics.
But at exactly the same time as the insurgent left and right mounted a
practical challenge to the "deliberative" character of democratic politics,
others of a much different ilk mounted an intellectual challenge to the
"deliberative" model of popular government.
If we look, albeit casually, to contemporaneous concerns about
democracy in the aftermath of World War I, we can do no better than to
consider the widely read, influential works of Walter Lippmann and, in

50. Id. at 342 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 344 (Pitney & Clarke, JJ., dissenting);
id. at 354 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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1
particular, his master work, Public Opinion."
Published in 1922, Public
Opinion was a rich elaboration of ideas first published by Lippmann in
magazine articles and issued in book form in 1920 as Liberty and the
News.5 2 Public Opinion also served as the inspiration of Lippmann's
subsequent work, The Phantom Public,53 published in 1925. The ideas of
Public Opinion may be said to have dominated his work for a decade a decade which is nearly coincident with the birth of "modern" first
amendment law and with the challenge of insurgent politics.
Lippman's work is not chosen casually. There is every reason to
consider it above others if we wish to understand the task to which early
first amendment law was addressed. We know Public Opinion was read
54
and esteemed both by Holmes and by Brandeis when it first came out.
Lippman solicited Holmes's reactions to the preliminary pieces that
appeared as articles. 55 And while neither Holmes nor Brandeis could

51. W.

LIPPMANN,

PUBLIC OPINION (1965). For an extensive treatment of Lippmann

and his work see R. STEELE, WALTER LIPPMANN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1980).

52. W. LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS (1920). The introductory essay of this work
originated in the 1920 publication. The second and third essays were published in 1919 in
the Atlantic Monthly.
53. W. LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925).

54. Laski wrote to Holmes on April 5, 1922:
[Tihe diagnosis is admirable with an amazing ability to lift the curtain which conceals
the intimate recesses of the mind. And yet what does it say at the end? . . .My
difficulty is that the expert has no more ability at interpreting facts than the first-rate
practical-minded amateur.
1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 416 (M. Howe ed. 1953). Holmes replied:
What you say about Lippmann's Public Opinion impresses me. I too was struck by his
not coming out anywhere - but much more by the intimate perception of the
subtleties of the human mind and of human relations.
Id. at 417 (April 22, 1922).
Brandeis, on April 8, 1922, wrote to Frankfurther that "[Holmes] is enthusiastic
over Walter's Public Opinion." V. BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 41, at 50. Brandeis also
wrote to Frankfurther after reading The Phantom Public:
But I think it is a remarkable book with the classic quality in thought and expression.
The defects are the inevitable ones due to his qualities and lacks which we have often
discussed . . . Still, I think his book will be distinctly helpful to those who try to
think on political sciences; and that this helpfulness will more than outweigh the
misuse which the Industrial Conference et al. will make of his statements. Walter's
criticisms should compel others who feel and care as we do, to come to grips with the
difficulties instead of closing their eyes ...
W.L. has a definite art as a mind, and a pen. For the rest we must look elsewhere.
V. BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 41, at 191.
55. See letter dated "Nov. 18," Walter Lippmann to O.W. Holmes, Jr., Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. Papers (Harvard Law School Library). The letter, based on internal evidence
is clearly from 1919 and asks Holmes to look at a forthcoming Atlantic Monthly article.
Lippmann says it is "a bit of a book on which I've been working intermittently for five
years and am nowhere near the end of. I'm examining how 'public opinion' is made, and
am deeply troubled by the effects of the tentative conclusions on our current theories of
popular government." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Papers, (Harvard Law School Library).
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stomach the essentially sophomoric quality of Lippmann's proposals,
they, like John Dewey who reviewed the book, could agree that it
presented an unsettling, powerful attack on the conceptual underpinnings of popular government.5 6
Lippmann triangulated the problem of "opinion" and "action."5 7 He
pointed out that conventional theories of popular government are
concerned with the link between what the people want and what
government, through its leaders, does. So conceived, popular government is a highly complex and abstruse problem of agency. 5' There are,
indeed, information problems - primarily concerned with communication of the preferences (including the intensities of preferences) of the
governed. And there are, of course, problems associated with fidelity to
one's office and charge. But, Lippmann pointed out, however real those
problems are, they assume the unproblematic character of the formation
of the "opinion" which we wish to be effectively communicated to the
governors and faithfully acted upon. Instead of a duality - governors
and governed - Lippmann proposes a triangle in which a reality is
apprehended (by the "public"), views concerning it are communicated to
the governors, and action is taken to reshape the reality. The
relationship between reality and opinion is every bit as problematic as
the "agency" between people and government. 5 9
The genius of Public Opinion was its application of the general
upheaval and interest in epistemology to the area of politics. Wittgenstein's Vienna epitomized the Western world. Knowledge had become
problematic across a broad front. There are sections of Public Opinion in
which Lippmann borrowed heavily from Marxist "sociology" of knowledge and anticipated some of the insights of Mannheim. ° Elsewhere,
Lippmann picked and chose from various concepts of psychology. But his
56. Dewey's review is in the NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1922, at 286-88. Dewey concludes
that "its critical portion is more successful than its constructive." Id. at 288. He starts his
review by conceding the book to be "perhaps the most effective indictment of democracy as
currently conceived ever penned." Id. at 286. We know that Holmes and Brandeis both
read the New Republic and esteemed Dewey.
57. PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 51, at 10 passim.
58. For an example of a more conventional treatment see I BRYCE, MODERN
DEMOCRACIES (1921). In Chapter XV Bryce's discussion of public opinion is dominated by
problems of definition and communication. Bryce comes closest to touching some of
Lippmann's primary concerns in Chapter X, The Press in a Democracy. See also A.
LOWELL, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT

(1913) for a conventional account.

Lowell's later work, Public Opinion in Peace and War, is still conventional but Lippmann's

work is occasionally cited. A
59.

PUBLIC OPINION,

LOWELL, PUBLIC OPINION IN PEACE AND WAR

(1923).

supra note 51, at 19 passim.

60. The first edition of Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia was published in 1929. Both
PUBLIC OPINION

and

THE PHANTOM PUBLIC

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA

249 (1949).

are noted in the bibliography. K.

MANNHEIM,
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eclecticism never defeated the unifying theme: the public opinion upon
which popular government is necessarily based itself bears a problematic relation to any relevant reality.
The orthodox theory holds that a public opinion constitutes a moral
judgment on a group of facts. The theory I am suggesting is that, in
the present state of education, a public opinion is primarily a
moralized and codified version of the facts. I am arguing that the
pattern of stereotypes at the center of our codes largely determines
what groups of facts we shall see, and in what light we shall see
them. That is why. . . a capitalist sees one set of facts, and certain
aspects of human nature, literally sees them; his socialist opponent
another set and other aspects, and why each regards the other as
unreasonable or perverse, when the real difference between them is
a difference of perception.
. . . The opponent has always to be explained, and the last
explanation that we ever look for is that he sees a different set of
facts. Such an explanation we avoid, because it saps the very
foundation of our own assurance that we have seen life steadily and
seen it whole. . . . For while men are willing to admit that there
are two sides to a "question," they do not believe that there are two
sides to what they regard as a "fact." And they never do believe it
until . . . they are fully conscious of how second-hand and
subjective is their apprehension of their social data.6 1
Here and in several other striking passages Lippmann approached
what Mannheim would later call the "total conception of ideology," a
conception in which opposing social groups challenge the intellectual
foundations of each other's thought and beliefs as the product of the
collective, contingent experience of the group. Thought is a function of
62
the place of the group in a social/economic structure.
Such a "total" ideological perspective is radically destructive of any
model of deliberative intergroup politics, and thus of broad-based,
liberal popular government. Lippmann, however, periodically backs off
from the more radical implications of his observations of political
epistemology and retreats to rather shallow, technocratic solutions. It is
almost as if he were afraid to apply his radical epistomology to social
science itself. (This was the very step that Mannheim so thoroughly
61. PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 51, at 81-82.
62. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 57-62 (1949). See also R. MERTON, SOCIAL
THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 457 (rev. ed. 1957): "Within a context of distrust Ibetween
groups], one no longer inquires into the content of beliefs and assertions to determine
whether they are valid or not, . . . but introduces an entirely new question: how does it
happen that these views are maintained? Thought becomes functionalized ..
"
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pursued several years later in Ideology and Utopia.) Lippmann proposed
government information bureaus and data specialists, thus implicitly
withdrawing the force of his critique from the broad front of political
epistomology to the much narrower one of data processing. Lippmann's
technocratic solutions did not find a sympathetic audience among the
most thoughtful of his contemporaries. But his critique of democratic
theory was acknowledged to be powerful.
Not all the problems Lippmann addressed were as radical and
intractable as that of ideology. One of the less subtle problems
addressed, and the only one to which his solutions are responsive, was
the lack of adequate machinery for generating data, communicating it
and making it interesting to a sufficiently large public to support the
idea of popular government.6 3 Even this most conventional of Lippmann's points raised serious questions about information deficiencies in
popular government, for it linked the economics of the media to their
adequacy as sources of information for the mass public. Lippmann, like
the more conventional Bryce and Lowell before him, was intensely
aware that a mass electorate was subject to influence by the yellow
press, and that the mass media made up a concentrated industry with
64
attendant political dangers.
Lippmann understood that other, more serious political dangers
come into focus once one analyzed the problematic character of opinion
formation. Government itself was in a position to manipulate opinion:
Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs,
persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of
popular government. . . . [T]he knowledge of how to create consent
will alter every political calculation and modify every political
premise.. . . It is no longer possible. . . to believe in the original
dogma of democracy.6 5
Lippmann provided subtle elaboration of this point. He attributed the
provincialism that many have found characteristic of democracy to a
half-conscious, correct realization that only in a truly provincial setting
could one approximate autonomous opinion formation by a citizenry not
subject to the manipulation of opinion elites. The realization that a
provincial setting is a precondition to a popular government leads to a
63. PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 51, at 226-62.
64. Id. at 226-30. See I BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 92-110 (1921).
65. PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 51, at 158. Lippmann's service with the War
Department in World War I alerted him to both the significance of "propaganda" and to its
dangers in the hands of fools. See R. STEELE, WALTER LIPPMANN AND THE AMERICAN
CENTURY 124-27, 141-54 (1980).
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collective act of wish fulfillment; a collective rejection of that part of our
social reality inconsistent with the desired provincial setting.
The democratic tradition is therefore always trying to see a world
where people are exclusively concerned with affairs of which the
causes and effects all operate within the region they inhabit. Never
has democratic theory been able to conceive itself in the context of a
wide and unpredictable environment. . . . And although democrats
recognize that they are in contact with external affairs, they see
quite surely that every contact outside that self-contained group is
a threat to democracy as originally conceived. That is a wise fear. If
democracy is to be spontaneous, the interests of democracy must
remain simple, intelligible and easily managed. . . . The environwithin the range of every man's direct and
ment must be confined
66
certain knowledge.
Lippmann did not shy away from the political and constitutional
implications of these insights. The prerequisites for such a provincialism no longer obtain. Politically, therefore, public affairs
can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests
reach beyond the locality. This class is irresponsible for it acts upon
information that is not common property, in situations that the
and it can be held to account only
public at large does not conceive,
67
on the accomplished fact.
Finally, Lippmann describes the limitations of civil liberty in the sense
of a free market place of ideas:
does not guarantee public opinion in the modern
[C]ivil liberty.
world. For it always assumes that truth is spontaneous, or that the
means of securing truth exist when there is no external interference. But when you are dealing with an invisible environment the
assumption is false. The truth about distant or complex matters is
not self-evident, and the machinery for assembling information is
technical and expensive.68
Lippmann's skepticism about the sufficiency of civil libertarian
ideas should not be construed to imply outright hostility to their
substance. His is an argument about the limits of such conventional
thought as part of a theory of government. He is striking not at
66. Id. at 171.
67. Id. at 195.
68. Id. at 202.
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toleration itself, but at the happy assumption that toleration is a
sufficient condition for popular government.
It ought not be supposed that Lippmann's elaborate statement
about the necessity for "organizing intelligence" and going beyond civil
liberty in order to provide the public and its decision makers with
information represented a seer's insight into an opaque process. The
need was transparent, and the justices from time to time had addressed
it. For example, in late 1918, in InternationalNews Service v. Associated
Press,6 9 the Court confronted a major question about the structure of the
news industry. Defendant International News Service (INS), a private,
for profit, wire service, had been copying Associated Press (AP) stories
from early editions of some papers and from public postings and had
been transmitting such stories to its subscribers as its own. Associated
Press sued, claiming a property right in its uncopyrighted stories that
gave it power to exclude others from using them at least until their
commercial value as news had disappeared. Pitney, for a majority of the
Court, held that there was such a right. He recognized that the case
presented important policy issues with respect to the organization of the
mass media and consequently with respect to the provision of information to the public. Pitney argued not only the intrinsic justice of a
remedy against such pirating, but also that the incentives for putting
together a news gathering and transmission organization depended
7°
upon the possibility of successful commercial exploitation of the news.
Justice Brandeis, in his elaborate dissent, conceded that the
majority's rule might protect the investment necessary for newsgathering on a world scale, but he pointed, as well, to the fact that many large
segments of the public were unserved by AP. An injunction restraining
INS could not, therefore, be understood as an unqualified boon to the
public's interest in information. Brandeis did not conclude from this,
however, that the wisest course was necessarily to leave AP's interest
unprotected. Rather, he concluded that any satisfactory scheme would
entail antecedent investigation and ongoing administration beyond the
capacity of courts. 7 '

69. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
70.
That business [news gathering and transmission consists in maintaining a prompt,
sure, steady, and reliable service designed to place the daily events of the world at the
breakfast table of the millions at a price that . . . is sufficient in the aggregate to
afford compensation for the cost of gathering and distributing it, with the added profit
so necessary as an incentive to effective action in the commercial world.
248 U.S. at 235.
71. Id. at 248, 262-63.
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He included here a famous critique of judge-made law:
[T]he unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and has often
satisfied new demands for justice by invoking analogies or by
expanding a rule or principle. This process has been in the main
wisely applied and should not be discontinued. Where the problem
is relatively simple, as it is apt to be when private interests only are
involved, it generally proves adequate. But with the increasing
complexity of society, the public interest tends to become omnipresent. . . . Then the creation or recognition by courts of a new
private right may work serious injury to the general public, unless
the boundaries of the right are definitely established and wisely
guarded. In order to reconcile the new private right with the public
interest, it may be necessary to prescribe limitations and rules for
its enjoyment; and also to provide administrative machinery for
enforcing the rules. It is largely for this reason that . . . resort to
legislation has latterly been had with increasing frequency.7 2
Brandeis concluded:
Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations
essential for full enjoyment for the rights conferred or to introduce
the machinery required for enforcement of such regulations.
Considerations such as these should lead us to decline to establish a
new rule of law in the effort to redress a newly-disclosed wrong,
although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.7 3
Here, Brandeis anticipates much of Lippmann. The organization of the
media is too important and complex to be left either to self-help or to the
judiciary. Serious public decision and administration would be necessary. It is interesting that in this opinion, rendered only months after
4
Hammer v. Dagenhart,7
Brandeis's strong distaste for judicializing
decisions of public import via the Constitution was extended to the
"common law." Here, as in labor matters, it was not so important what
wisdom dictated as the reference to the legislative process where
deliberation might take place. As we shall see from Brandeis's later first
amendment cases, it is the legislature which clears the market in the
trade in ideas.
The Associated Press decision demonstrates both an awareness that
the structure of the media is relevant to public opinion and deliberation,
72. Id. at 262-63.
73. Id. at 267.
74. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Brandeis joined the dissent of Holmes. Id. at 277-81. See also
BICKEL, supra note 41, at 1-20.
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and a total disinterest in constitutionalizing any particular solution to
the problem. It may be that the Constitution, as a constraint on
government, did not suggest itself as the relevant source of law when
the dispute appeared to be one between private competitors. It is to be
noted that Brandeis's inclination to legislative and administrative
solutions or experiments would, naturally enough, lead more directly to
constitutional difficulties.
THE DEFENSE OF DELIBERATION: LIBERAL IDEOLOGY

As

CONSTITUTIONAL UTOPIA

In Associated Press, then, the Court began to grapple with the
problems of the role of information in democracy. The majority, though
not unaware of the larger themes, treated the case within a narrow
framework of the law of trade practices. Justice Brandeis's far-ranging
dissent was more directly concerned with the problem of information in
democracy but was wholly agnostic as to any solution. He had
characteristically referred the matter to the legislature. With the Draft
and Espionage Act cases of 1919, any idea that the Court might avoid
the necessity of speaking to the relation between public information and
popular government disappeared. This section treats the development of
a libertarian tradition in free speech law from those 1919 cases to
5
Brandeis's 1927 concurrence in Whitney v. California."
I am less
concerned with what the "law" of free speech was at any given time
during the decade than with the development of an "answer" to the
urgent questions placed upon the Court's agenda by the practical
threats of domestic disorder and world-wide revolution and by the
theoretical threats posed by the ideas of a manipulated public opinion
and a contingent consciousness. Brandeis's Whitney opinion represented
a comprehensive ideological response relevant to all these concerns. It
thus deserves its place as a classic statement of free speech and
warrants our prolonged attention in the historical treatment of these
ideas.
In Schenck v. United States,76 Frohweck v. United States,77 and
Debs v. United States,7 8 Holmes wrote his famous opinions for a
unanimous Court upholding convictions against first amendment
attack. In Schenck he articulated the . . . "clear and present danger

75.
76.
77.
78.

274
249
249
249

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

357 (1927).
47 (1919).
204 (1919).
211 (1919).
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test, 7 9 and in the other two cases purported to apply it. The test was
born, thus, as an apology for repression.
Between Debs and Abrams v. United States,8 0 as several scholars
have shown, Holmes corresponded with Zachariah Chafee 8 1 and with
Learned Hand, 2 read critical reviews of Debs, and even considered
replying to them.83 Arguably, Holmes began to move to a position
regarding the use of the "clear and present danger" formula inconsistent
with its application in Debs.8 a With his famous Abrams dissent Holmes
marked a major change and took a giant step in advancing the
libertarian tradition.
The Abrams dissent was significant in several ways. It was most
important in marking the first departure from the Court's unanimity in
upholding the wartime prosecutions. We now know that this unanimity
was quite significant to the Court. In his memoirs, Dean Acheson, who
was Brandeis's clerk during that period, retells a story told to him by
Holmes's clerk in 1919, Stanley Morrison. Morrison described what took
place after Holmes and Brandeis had indicated their intent to dissent in
Abrams:
Justice Holmes was then waited on by three of his colleagues, who
brought Mrs. Holmes with them.
[Two] were Justices Van Devanter and Pitney for whom Holmes
had warm regard. They laid before him their request that in this
case, which they thought affected the safety of the country, he
should, like the old soldier he had once been, close ranks and forego
individual predilections. Mrs. Holmes agreed. The tone of the

79. 249 U.S. 47, 52.
80. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
81. See Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the
Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24
(1971).
82. See Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 739-41 (1975) (reprinting
parts of some of the most significant letters).
83. Ernst Freund wrote a scathing critique of Debs. Freund, The Debs Case and
Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919, at 13, reprinted in 40 U. C11i. L. REV. 239
(1973). For an account of Holmes' correspondence concerning that article, see GINSBURG,
Afterword, 40 U. CII. L. REV. 243, 245 (1973). See I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 202-04 (M.
Howe ed. 1953) for a draft of a letter to Herbert Croly, editor of the New Republic, a letter
which Holmes decided not to send.
84. That is the conclusion of Harry Kalven in Kalven, Professor Ernst Freund and
Debs v. United States, 40 U. Cill. L. REv. 235, 238 (1973). That is also the conclusion of
Chafee, Ragan, and Gunther.
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discussion was at all times friendly, even affectionate. The Justice
regretted that he could not do as they wished. They did not press.8 5
By dissenting in Abrams, then, Holmes not only argued that the
Constitution tolerated dissent, he also exemplified the dissent. Moreover, in so doing he signalled by his own example, and against the urgings
of colleagues and spouse, that no present emergency justified the
imposition of uniformity of opinion. To put it differently, to have
complied with the requests of his colleagues surely would have meant
conceding the existence of a state of affairs which might justify silencing
others as it would justify silencing himself. No one could have
symbolized more potently the legitimacy of dissent than the old soldier,
Holmes.
The second accomplishment of the Abrams dissent was the transformation of the phrase "clear and present danger" from an apology for
repression into a commitment to oppose authority. In the Abrams
dissent the phrase is shown to have great critical potential. The
establishment of an ambivalent character for the Schenck test meant
that will and judgment - precisely those elements subject to ideological
predisposition - would control future applications. The dissent made an
ideological critique of the Court's conclusions more plausible.
The third achievement of the Abrams dissent was the introduction
into our rhetoric of the metaphor of "free trade" and "competition of the
market" in ideas.8 6 This image, which was never used by Brandeis,
suggests a number of important ideas that will be contrasted with
Brandeis's rhetoric. I shall only enumerate the ideas here, leaving their
development to later. First, a market in ideas suggests the arbitrary
character of any given proposed idea. Like market preferences, beliefs
and opinions are simply there. Second, the market is a radically
decentralized decision mechanism. Third, the market depends upon
freedom from external constraint to operate properly. Finally, the
market produces decisions about allocation and production without
authority. It is efficient while being unresponsive to reasoned manipulation. To impose a solution is not to make it work but to deny it the
opportunity to work.
In short, by late 1919 Holmes had given us a two-edged test, "clear
and present danger," in the apologetic application of which his brethren
had concurred, and had created a suggestive metaphor which to liberal
nineteenth century men certainly implied the absence of governmental
constraint.
85. D. ACHESON, MORNING
86. 250 U.S. at 630.

AND NOON

119 (1965).
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The development of Brandeis's thought was very different from that
of Holmes. By 1923 Brandeis had come to regret that he had not written
separately in the 1919 cases. His 1923 remarks to Felix Frankfurter
reveal a great deal about the early opinions:
I have never been quite happy about my concurrence in Debs and
Schenck cases. I had not then thought the issues of freedom of
speech out - I thought at the subject, not through it. Not until I
came to write the Pierce and Schaefer cases did I understand it. I
would have placed the Debs case on the war power - instead of
taking Holmes's line about "clear and present danger." Put it
frankly on war power - like Hamilton case [Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919)] - and then the
scope of the espionage legislation would be confined to war. [In the
Hamilton opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, the Court
upheld the War-time Prohibition Act, ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1045, 1046
(1918), on the ground that it was a reasonable exercise of Congress's
power to make all laws "necessary and proper" for carrying into
execution its express war powers.] But in peace the protection
against restrictions of freedom of speech would be unabated. You
might as well recognize that during a war - FF: All bets are off.
LDB: Yes, all bets are off. But we would have a clear line to go on. I
didn't know enough in the early cases to put it on that ground. Of
course you must also remember that when Holmes writes, he
doesn't give a fellow a chance - he shoots so quickly.
But in Schaefer and Pierce cases I made up my mind I would put it
all out, let the future know
what weren't allowed to say in the days
87
of the war and following.
What Brandeis had not thought through in Schenck and Debs,
however, was not simply the formulation of a legal test. For it is
remarkable that the constant refrain in all his subsequent free speech

87. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, Brandeis Papers (Harvard Law

School

Library). Part of this passage is quoted in A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 27-28 (1978). Bickel omits the interesting passage which says in essence that

when Holmes writes he doesn't give a fellow a chance. This theme, that Holmes's speed in
opinion writing sometimes produced insufficient consideration by his brethren, appears
elsewhere in the manuscript of the Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations. Brandeis was
apparently led by it to suggest, in vain, that the Court adopt a rule requiring finished

opinions to be held eight days before publication except when waived by unanimous
consent.
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opinions, Pierce v. United States,"8 Schaefer v. United States,8 9 Gilbert v.
Minnesota,9° United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub92
lishing Co. v. Burleson,91 Whitney v. California,
and Burns v. United
93
States is that the Schenck "clear and present danger" articulation is
appropriate and either is not being applied or is being misapplied or
misunderstood by the majority. One might suppose that Brandeis, in the
later cases, argued from the "clear and present danger" formulation
because it had been accepted by the Court in Schenck, and thus would
have a better chance of securing support than would the absolutist test
suggested by the word "unabated" in the Frankfurter conversation.
However, where he deemed it appropriate, as in Gilbert v. Minnesota,
Brandeis was quite capable of radical free speech formulations in
dissent.9 4 Moreover, as we shall see, the Brandeis opinions present a
coherent whole in which the "clear and present danger" test as modified
has an important part to play. The Frankfurter conversation which was,
after all, a good deal more casually formulated than were the opinions,
is susceptible to the interpretation not that the "clear and present
danger" test is generally wrong or inappropriate but that it was wrong
for Debs! The Debs conclusion and the use of the test suggested by it
could only be supported by a war powers analysis.9 5
Brandeis, in the 1920 cases, made a twofold addition to Holmes's
critical use of the "clear and present danger" test and market metaphor
in Abrams. First, he explicated the precise institutional consequences of
the "clear and present danger" test. Holmes in Abrams had left vague
88. 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
89. 251 U.S. 466, 982 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
90. 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
91. 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
92. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring opinion).
93. 274 U.S. 328, 337 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
94. When the ideas in the Brandeis Gilbert dissent were proposed, Brandeis's clerk,
Dean Acheson, characterized them as "altogether out of the question" and "impossible."
See memorandum of Nov. 19, 1920 [Acheson] in the Gilbert v. Minnesota case files,
Brandeis Papers (Harvard Law School Library). For an admiring modern view see C.
BLACK, PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTIUTIONAL LAW 84-86 (1970).
95. Harry Kalven made the point that Debs and Schenk must be read together.
Kalven, supra note 84, at 236. If so read they are surely inconsistent with the strict view
of clear and present danger taken by Brandeis in the later cases. Id. Note that Brandeis
wrote the Hamilton opinion, Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251
U.S. 146 (1919), a year after Debs and supported the view that Congress can act
domestically in a manner otherwise unconstitutional to further the war effort. Moreover,
the power exercised, prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages, bore only an indirect
relation to the war effort. We tend to forget how many extraordinary powers, then thought
to be of doubtful constitutionality, were exercised by the federal government during World
War I, including management of the railroads and of shipping, and drastic regulation of
most critical industrial sectors.
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the device by which the test should make it impossible to convict or to
harshly sentence the defendants. Was the indictment in some sense
bad? Should there have been a directed verdict of acquittal on the basis
of the text of the utterances, or the circumstances in which uttered? Did
Holmes really mean to suggest Supreme Court review of the severity of
the sentence? In the Pierce and Schaefer dissents Brandeis spelled out
the institutional consequences of his position. Judges must control juries
and make an independent judgment, one that would be reviewable by
the appellate courts, as to whether the nature of the utterance in the
circumstances attending it created the clear and present danger
required by Schenck. Ultimately, the judge would pass upon whether
the jury's conclusion implicit in a general verdict of conviction had been
justified.96
But Brandeis had done more than think through the institutional
consequences of the test. He had also thought through the politicaltheory justifications for it. The Schaefer opinion has little of such
97
theory. It emerges first in Pierce, then blossoms fully in Gilbert.
In Pierce the same institutional points are made as in Schaefer, but
conjoined with them is an epigrammatic paragraph:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions
through new legislation and new institutions will not be preserved,
if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be
construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law merely, because the argument presented seems to those exercising
judicial power to be unfair in98its assumptions, unsound in reasoning
or intemperate in language.
96. In Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 483 (1920), Brandeis stated:
The question whether in a particular instance the words spoken or written fall within
the permissible curtailment of free speech is, under the rule [clear and present
danger] enunciated by this court, one of degree. And because it is a question of degree
the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment is, necessarily, a wide one. But
its field is not unlimited. The trial provided for is one by judge and jury; and the judge
may not abdicate his function. If the words were of such a nature and were used under
such circumstances that men, judging in calmness, could not reasonably say that they
created a clear and present danger that they would bring about the evil which
Congress sought and had a right to prevent, then it is the duty of the trial judge to
withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury; and if he fails to do so, it is the
duty of the appellate court to correct the error.
See Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 269, 272 (1920.
97. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334-43 (1920). See discussion at note 102
infra.
98. 252 U.S. at 334. Holmes returned his copy of the Brandeis draft dissent in Pierce
with the suggestion to "make a little more explicit the false statement was not merely I?]
but that it was discussion of a public fact of public interest." Brandeis Papers, File 4-2
(Harvard Law School Library) (emphasis in the original).
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This theme becomes Brandeis's chief free speech refrain - not that
truth will prevail in some market place of ideas but that free input is
necessary to deliberative politics. The theme is even more pronounced
in Gilbert v. Minnesota, where it constitutes the basis for a legal
masterpiece.

99

In Gilbert, Brandeis confronted an extraordinarily difficult series of
technical legal questions. Gilbert had been convicted of violating a
Minnesota statute which made it unlawful "to advocate that men should
not enlist" or "to teach

. .

.

that citizens of this state should not aid or

assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with [its]
public enemies. ' 1°° In the state courts Gilbert's counsel had objected to
the introduction of any evidence, on the very general ground that the
statements were of the type that Gilbert had a right to make under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. No further specification of
errors was made until Gilbert petitioned the state supreme court for a
reargument. The assignment of error before the U.S. Supreme Court
cited only the overruling of the objection to the evidence as error and
generally alleged that statements made were constitutionally
protected.101

These elements posed the following legal problems. First, was it
possible to find a source of protection for speech operative against state
infringement? It was not apparent that the first amendment operated
against the states by its own force, nor was there clear authority for the
proposition that the fourteenth amendment included free expression
within its due process protections of substantive liberties. 10 2 For
99. 254 U.S. 325, 334.
100. Id. at 326-27.
101. See memorandum from Dean Acheson to Justice Brandeis, Nov. 19, 1920,
Brandeis Papers, File 5-12 (Harvard Law School Library), (raising procedural doubts
about the case). None of the actual opinions expresses doubt about the propriety of
reaching the merits, though Brandeis would surely have been the most likely to have
expressed such reservations. See Ch. I, The Most Important Thing We Do Is Not Doing, in

A.

BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS

(1957).

102. The question of whether or how the first amendment may be said to have created
restraints upon the states in 1920 is a complex one. In the majority opinion in Gilbert, Mr.
Justice McKenna sp.-aks of the "right of free speech" rather than the first amendment. He
concedes arguendo "without so deciding" that the "asserted freedom is natural and
inherent." 254 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). He then argues that the freedom is not
absolute and that, conceding arguendo that it applies against the states, it would not
protect the conduct at issue in the case. Id. at 333.
As late as 1922, in dicta in a commercial context, Mr. Justice Pitney in an opinion
for the Court was able to say that "the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the
States no obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction either the right of free
speech or the right of silence." Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538
(1922). The issue in Cheek was the rather interesting one of whether employers could be
required to give (truthful) reference letters upon the request of former employees.
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Brandeis, who was strongly opposed to extending the reach of substantive due process, it would have been difficult to push hard for expansion
Prudential argued inter alia that the requirement violated its free speech rights. It was, of
course, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), that the Court said: "For present
purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id. at 666.
Some commentators have suggested that in Gilbert Brandeis was arguing for
substantive due process protection of free speech. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE U.S.
295-96 (1941). I read the opinion somewhat differently. The last paragraph of the dissent
begins: "As the Minnesota statute is in my opinion invalid because it interferes with
federal functions and with the right of a citizen of the United States to discuss them, I see
no occasion to consider whether it violates also the Fourteenth Amendment." 254 U.S. at
343. Brandeis then attaches a long "But..." which concludes "I cannot believe that the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to
enjoy property." Id. It seems to me that Brandeis here relates two essentials in his
constitutional jurisprudence - his antipathy to substantive due process and his firm
espousal of free expression. It is significant that the last paragraph begins by saying the
fourteenth amendment argument is not needed, for it places a contingent note upon the
rest. The tone seems to me to suggest that, if one must have Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915), and other horrors in our jurisprudence, then surely the principle of those cases
justifies extending free speech to the states. But it seems to me that Brandeis is holding
back precisely so that it remains possible for him to deny substantive due process
altogether.
Frankfurter's notes on summer conversations with Brandeis set forth
Frankfurter's sketchy recollections of Brandeis's views on this subject.
Long talk on the application (?) of due process as to freedom of speech and foreign
language cases. Agreed.
1. Due process should be restricted to procedural regularity and
2. In favor of repeal but
3. While it is, must be applied to substantive laws and so as to things that are
fundamental.
Right to appeal,
Right to education,
Right to choice of profession,
Right to locomotion,
are such fundamental rights not to be impaired or withdrawn except as judged by
"clear and present danger" test. Holmes says doesn't want to extend XIV.
L.D.B. says it means - you are going to cut down freedom through striking
down regulation of property but not give protection (?). Property, it is
absurd as Holmes says, to deem fundamental in the sense that you can't
curtail its use or its accumulation or power. There may be some aspects of
property that are fundamental - but not regard[ed] as fundamental
specific limitations upon it. Whereas right to your education and to utter
speech is fundamental except clear and present danger.
Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, Brandeis Papers (Harvard Law School Library)
(emphasis added). See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 25-26
(1970), where this text is referred to and quoted in part.
This conversation almost certainly took place in Chatham in 1923, the summer after
the decisions in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 262 U.S. 22 (1922), and Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), cases mentioned in a later portion of the same text, and
the summer after Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404 (1923), which are referred to obliquely as the "foreign language cases." Brandeis and
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of that term. Moreover, there was a procedural difficulty presented by a
fourteenth amendment claim. The defendant arguably had failed to
Such was the initial
present the fourteenth amendment claim below.
10 3
conclusion of Brandeis's clerk, Dean Acheson.
Brandeis was as yet unprepared to make the concession to
substantive due process that he had made in Whitney v. California:that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protected liberty of
expression much as the majority had been holding that it protected the
liberty of contract. 10 4 Rather, Brandeis argued that exclusive national
jurisdiction over the national functions of conscription and war required
constitutional immunity from state interference with the flow of public
deliberation necessary to informed legislation. Brandeis asserted that
[t]he right to speak freely concerning functions of the Federal
Government is a privilege or immunity of every citizen of the
United States which, even before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a State was powerless to curtail. . . The right of a
citizen of the United States to take part, for his own or the country's
benefit, in the making of federal laws and in the conduct of the
Government, necessarily includes the right to speak or write about
them; to endeavor to make his own opinion concerning laws
existing or contemplated prevail; and, to this end, to teach the truth
as he sees it. . . . Full and free exercise of this right by the citizen
is ordinarily also his duty; for0 5its exercise is more important to the
Nation than it is to himself.1
The power of Brandeis's formulation here, though it never prevailed, is extraordinary. As to any subject within the national
legislative competence, states would be prohibited from inhibiting free
expression by the force of a kind of structural preemption argument in
which the deliberations of Congress are presumed to require the

Frankfurter were together that summer. See V. BRANDEIs LETTERS, supra note 41, at 98,
100. The conversation shows a transition from Gilbert, where Brandeis refrains from
basing his opinion on due process, to Whitney, in which he explicitly uses the due process
rationale. Here, Brandeis has decided that if there is to be substantive due process it must
be directed from property to free speech and education issues. See Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927). The Frankfurter conversation also demonstrates how important
avoiding the due process rationale must have been. Gilbert thus assumes greater
significance to Brandeis since he contemplated doing away with any substantive reliance
on the clause.
103. Memorandum of Dean Acheson to Louis Brandeis, Brandeis Papers, File 5-12
(Harvard Law School Library).
104. See note 102 supra.
105. 254 U.S. at 337-38.
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participation of a public in which many conflicting opinions are
represented. Of course Congress, as opposed to the states, might decide
it does not want certain kinds of input, but that decision would be
directly foreclosed for all but clear and present danger situations by the
first amendment. It is thus the model of constitutionally mandated
deliberative government at the federal level that inhibits state proscriptions without recourse to substantive due process - truly a tour de
force. 106
It is interesting to contrast Brandeis's eloquent formulation of the
speech preemption argument with a similar argument by Chafee in the
first edition of his classic book, Freedom of Speech. l"' In preparation for
the Gilbert opinion, Dean Acheson wrote to Chafee on Brandeis's behalf
and secured page proofs of the relevant portions of the book, which was
then in preparation.1 0 s Chafee does make the argument that the
Minnesota statute and others like it ought to be viewed as preempted by
federal legislation on the subject. And he argues that if Congress and
the executive wish to permit discussion "it is very unfortunate that
their policy should be hampered by bitter prosecutions based on an
entirely different policy.
."109 Chafee goes on to chronicle "discontent" that might thus smolder and eventually disrupt the war effort.
Brandeis's opinion is not only more eloquent, but it emphasizes a
different underlying principle. To Brandeis, it is not potential disruption
of the war that grounds preemption but disruption of the national
deliberativepolitical process - a process with a purpose as "high" as any
we have.
The only limitation that can exist on that deliberation is the power
of Congress to prohibit interference with the draft or interference with

106. See C. BLACK, £ERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83-93 (1963). The notion
that article IV privileges and immunities include freedom of expression on national issues
was at earlier times most prominently expressed by the abolitionists. See W. WIECEK, THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848 (1977).
107. Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 110-13 (1920).
108. The Gilbert files in the Brandeis papers (Harvard Law School Library) contain
two letters from Chafee to Acheson, one dated November 20, 1920 and one dated
November 24. Chafee's letters included galley proofs of chapter II, part VII of Freedom of
Speech which treats the state espionage acts as well as galleys of Appendix V, entitled
State War & Peace Statutes Affecting Freedom of Speech. In the November 20 letter Chafee
laments: "Except for the dissent in 108 At]. 318 which came after I wrote this, I have as
yet got no one to agree with my Constitutional argument that the state powers over
opposition to war are no stronger than state powers over interstate railroads, so that ..
"
Letter from Chafee to Acheson, Nov. 20, 1920, Brandeis Papers, File 5-12 (Harvard Law
School Library).
109. Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECII 112 (1920.
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11
the war effort in order "to avert a clear and present danger."
Moreover, Brandeis forged a link between the clear and present danger
test and the primacy of political deliberation.

There are times when those charged with the responsibility of
Government, faced with clear and present danger, may conclude
that suppression of divergent opinion is imperative, because the
emergency does not permit reliance upon the slower conquest of error
by truth. And in such emergencies the power to suppress exists. 1 1'
In this rationale for the "clear and present danger" test, the test is
turned into an exception. The issue is not so much whether there is a
sufficient danger that the undesirable result will occur, but rather
whether the feared result will occur before the deliberative process can
have a fair chance to work. There are, in effect, no exceptions to what
must be made subject to deliberative politics where the capacity to
deliberate is intact. To this remarkable opinion, Holmes replied, "I
think you go too far. I have marked McK[enna]'s Op.[inion] 'Concur in
result on the record.' ,112 It is the only free speech case in the decade in
which Holmes and Brandeis reach conflicting results.
Before addressing the culmination of the liberal tradition in the
1920's with the Gitlow and Whitney opinions, it is well to take stock of
the weak points of the respective Holmes and Brandeis formulations.
Holmes had stated the "clear and present danger" test but left its
institutional consequences vague. He had eloquently articulated a faith
in the open process of competition in ideas, but had failed to specify,
save metaphorically, how the struggle of ideas was related to the
production of truth or decision in the polity. The market metaphor was
anti-political.
Brandeis had outlined the concrete ramifications of the "clear and
present danger" test as between judge and jury, trial judge and
appellate court. He had specified the relationship of the struggle of ideas
to political decisionmaking in the legislature, that is, to popular
government. Moreover, he had confined "clear and present danger" to
the status of an emergency exception to political deliberation. However,
in specifying the political decision processes to which free expression is
relevant, Brandeis had not accounted for the many non-political and
informal ways that cultures and societies arrive at "truth." Holmes's
110. 254 U.S. at 336.
111. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
112. Letter from Holmes to Brandeis, Brandeis Papers, File 5-13 (Harvard Law School
Library).
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formulation left secure the non-governmental character of a philosophical phenomenon. Brandeis brought philosophy down to earth but may
have improverished it in stressing concrete political processes. In the
later opinions of Gitlow and Whitney the tendencies of the two justices
remain visibly distinct, although in Whitney, as we shall see, there is
strong evidence of growth in Brandeis's conception of the problemgrowth which incorporates some of Holmes's distinctive perspective. 13
The majority opinion by Justice Sanford in Gitlow v. New York'
largely denied the applicability of the clear and present danger test to
Ctcriminal anarchy" legislation. He, in effect, read Schenck narrowly as
providing a special rule for treating speech as an element in the
commission of an inchoate crime. Thus, the "clear and present danger"
formulation became merely a way of measuring whether the speech
came close enough to the centrally proscribed conduct, i.e., interference
with the draft, sedition or espionage. But where the legislatively
proscribed conduct was the advocacy of a doctrine itself, as in the
criminal syndicalism and anarchy statutes at issue in the cases of the
mid-1920's, then Sanford considered it senseless to measure the
1 14
proximity of the speech to the proscribed conduct.
Holmes, in his Gitlow dissent, insisted that the Schenck test,
properly applied, was a measure for legislative classification as well." 5
That is, the central operative words of the test were clear and present
'
danger of "substantive evils that [the State] has a right to prevent."116
Thus, the question in Gitlow would not be the proximity and danger of
advocating overthrow, but the proximity and danger of actual overthrow
of government. Holmes's conclusion concerning Gitlow was that:
[W]hatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it
had no chance of stating a present conflagration. If in the long run
the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way. 17
In addition to the clarification or, more accurately, the expansion of
the "clear and present danger" test, there is also an important
continuity with the Abrams themes. For, in Gitlow, as in Abrams,
Holmes refused to tie the rationale for liberty of expression to specific
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Id. at 670-71 (distinguishing Schenck).
268 U.S. at 672.
Id. at 672-73 (emphasis added).
Id. at 673.
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governmental processes or deliberations. When Holmes spoke of our
constitutionally mandated institutional indifference to the long term
triumph of the idea of "proletarian dictatorship", he did not say "if this
idea is adopted by the legislature" or "if this idea is ratified into our
Constitution" or even "if this idea is destined to be accepted by a
majority of the voters." Instead, he used what are, in effect, terms of art
in saying "if [these ideas] are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces in the community." Holmes's notion of how societies do in fact
arrive at political "truths" was thus by no means institutional in
character. Holmes's perspective on tolerance combined skepticism and
fatalism about the ideas which would ultimately prevail: a philosophical
skepticism about "truths" and Spencerian fatalsim about long-term
social destiny. Holmes's most attractive moments, however, are found in
his existential poses as the fighter for values in spite of the perception of
a cosmic void and the long-run earthly insignificance of individual
action. The "clear and present danger" test that he formulated
permitted society to act affirmatively within the bounds of the tightly
circumscribed time frame of effective human knowledge while preserving an ideational gene pool for future social evolution.'1 '
In many ways the criminal syndicalism statutes posed more of a
problem for Brandeis than for Holmes. Brandeis's most powerful
statements on behalf of liberty of expression had been closely tied to the
political deliberation of popular government, of which the legislative
process was paradigmatic. But the restraints imposed by the criminal
syndicalism law were directed, at least in theory, against those who
preached and organized overthrow of government by force. It is possible
to see how a faith in an invisible hand in the market place of ideas, or
how belief in the process of social evolution with its gradual mutations
of ideas and societies, might treat even this "preference" or "gene"
(depending upon the metaphor) as potentially valuable and necessary
for an unknown future product. But if one is concerned with the quality
of political deliberation, especially in the legislative forum, it is
somewhat more difficult to specify how speech and organization aimed
at subverting that deliberative process have special value. They may
provide data about the society and dissatisfaction, but so may riots and
theft. It is not apparent that they are in any meaningful sense parts of
the deliberation itself. Brandeis saw this difficulty and addressed it
directly in Whitney.

118. There are obviously many "sources" for these views of Holmes. Both the classic
liberalism of Mills and the social Darwinism of Spencer converge in their notion that in
minorities may reside the seed for future growth of society.
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Brandeis's Whitney concurrence"1 9 started out as a dissent in the
case of Ruthenberg v. Michigan.120 Virtually every bit of the free speech
theory and rhetoric in the opinion was crafted to its present form and
fitted to the facts of Ruthenberg, but it was rendered moot when the
defendant in that case died. 121 Brandeis then grafted the long free
speech essay to what had started as a very short, page-and-a-half
concurrence in Whitney.122 It is of some relevance to know this because
it removes at least one red herring from an understanding of how far
Brandeis intended to go. Within the Communist labor party, Anita
Whitney herself had stood with the so-called "political faction" which
argued for continuation of participation by the party in some forms of
conventional politics. 1 23 She was a most sympathetic, goodhearted
former social worker of impeccable family. Ruthenberg, however, had
been the first national secretary of the Communist Party. After his
arrest in 1922, he had remained a major figure on the national level in
the Communist Party and had attended the "Bridgman Convention" as
a member of the central executive committee. Although not an advocate
of immediate revolution, Ruthenberg had personally authored statements calling for "extra-parliamentary means of achieving power." In
his own words, "this includes the use of armed force.' 2' Brandeis's
119. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring opinion).
120. 273 U.S. 782 (1927). See Whitney v. California files, Brandeis Papers, Files 44-5
through 44-9 (Harvard Law School Library) (containing drafts of a Ruthenberg v.
Michigan opinion which develop verbatim the rhetoric which finally emerged in the
Whitney opinion).
121. 273 U.S. 782 (1927).
122. See Brandeis Papers, File 44-10 (Harvard Law School Library) for a draft of a
bare-bones Whitney opinion which refers the reader to the Ruthenberg dissent.
123. See Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 1-2, 11-13 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), where counsel for Anita Whitney press this point. It was picked up by
contemporaneous commentators. See Felix Frankfurter's article written after Whitney's
conviction but prior to the Supreme Court decision. F. FRANKFURTER, The Case of Anita

Whitney, in FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE SUPREME COURT 180 (P. Kurland ed. 1970)
(reprinting an editorial in the NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 1925).
124. See People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 339, 201 N.W. 358, 365 (1924). The
Court reviews specific evidence linking the defendant to the general purposes of the
organization and rendering it appropriate to attribute to him those purposes. Id. at
335-36, 339-40, 201 N.W. at 364, 365-66. The opinion of Judge Wiest for the Court can
in no way be characterized as calm or dispassionate. But there are many more specifics
linking Ruthenberg to the means and objectives of revolutionary (i.e., violent) overthrow
of government than was the case for Anita Whitney. Ruthenberg, elected the first
National Secretary of the Communist Party in 1919, was characterized by a leading
historian of the Party as "[t]he man who emerged from the conventions in 1919 as the
outstanding American Communist." T. DRAPER, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 193
(1977); and see this work, passim, for the significance of Ruthenberg throughout the
period. Anita Whitney rates a single, brief mention in this standard work on American
Communism while Ruthenberg's name pervades the work and is second only to that of
Louis Fraina in significance for this early period of the Party.
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concurrence in Whitney was authored as a dissent for the Ruthenberg
case, and it must be understood as applicable to the facts of that case: to
the conviction of a hard-core, national leader of the Party, apprehended
while attempting to cover the retreat of a secret convention at which the
first official envoy of the Comintern was attempting to dictate party
unity on the basis of a plan which included a secret, extra-legal party
apparatus. Early drafts of Brandeis's Ruthenberg opinion included a
paragraph characterizing the Communist Party as a conspiracy to train
cadres for infiltration. Brandeis concluded, however, that this character
was insufficient to justify repression without evidence of the immediate
danger of illegal acts resulting therefrom.12
The most striking new element in Brandeis's thought that is
revealed by the Whitney concurrence is the shift from a focus upon
legislative process to a more inclusive public politics. The essay on free
speech begins by characterizing the essential choice of political modes as
being one between the "deliberative" and the "arbitrary."'126 The
commitment to the "deliberative" mode is then historically validated as
the act of the Founders to which an ongoing commitment is eternally
necessary. Brandeis's research for the Whitney/Ruthenberg opinion
suggests some of the principal problems that this commitment entailed.
What is the role of the call to disorderly, non-deliberative change in
politics? Brandeis had James Landis, his clerk in 1925-1926, prepare a
memorandum on calls to resistance of the Fugitive Slave Law and
resistance to Prohibition.1 27 It is likely that from such research there
emerged the language in the opinion: "Every denunciation of existing
law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be
12 s
violation of it.'
Brandeis did not deny the danger, but required the commitment to
liberty in the face of it as an act of courage demanded by the structure
of our politics. This understanding of liberty of expression deepens the
sense that "clear and present danger" is to be understood as applicable
only to those emergencies in which the deliberative mode has insufficient time to operate. Brandeis had come to believe that the great
dichotomy was between the deliberative and the arbitrary, between
reason and force in politics. Law mediates that dichotomy and becomes

125. See early drafts ofRuthenberg v. Michigan, Brandeis Papers, File 44-5 (Harvard
Law School Library). On the Bridgman Convention see T. DRAPER, supra note 124, at
363-75.
126. 274 U.S. at 375.
127. Brandeis Papers, File 44-6 (Harvard Law School Library). This memorandum is
really a list of quotations.
128. 274 U.S. at 376.
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justifiably arbitrary and coercive only by remaining the product of as
purely deliberative a process as possible. Scrawled in Brandeis's hand
across the back of Landis's memorandum on calls to resist the Fugitive
Slave Law and Prohibition is the first approximation, and then the final
language, of the sentence in Whitney which identifies the force of law
itself with the arbitrary in the public space of politics.
First there is written: "Believers in the force of reason they rejected
silencing by law as the argument of force." Then underneath that
sentence is scrawled: "As I interpret their acts - Believing in the power
of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
1 29
coerced by law - the argument of force in the worst form."'
The Whitney concurrence (or rather the Ruthenberg dissent) was
intended to accomplish two related objectives. First, it was to elaborate
the centrality of a free and open public space in our politics and to relate
that space to a courageous commitment to undertake the admitted risks
entailed. Brandeis, while asserting that the Communist Party of the
United States did not present, in 1922, a clear and present danger of the
imminent overthrow of the government, could hardly dismiss the party
in the cavalier manner used by Holmes to characterize the defendants
in the Abrams dissent. Some risk was present.
Second, the WhitneylRuthenberg opinion of Brandeis laid out a
program for legal elaboration of the clear and present danger test.
This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine
when a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may
be and yet be deemed present; and what degree of evil shall be
deemed sufficiently substantial to justify resort to abridgement
of
30
free speech and assembly as the means of protection.'
But that elaboration required explicit reference to the larger, background purposes of the first amendment.
The commitment to reason and deliberation thus answered the
question of how "clear" and how imminent the danger must be. "If there
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify
repression. '' 131 Moreover, since the commitment to deliberation was so
central politically, Brandeis added a new note by insisting that the

129. Brandeis Papers, File 44-6 (Harvard Law School Library). The last quoted
sentence appears almost verbatim in 274 U.S. at 375.
130. 274 U.S. at 374.
131. Id. at 377.
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"clear and present" evil be
sufficiently substantial to warrant the
1 32
inhibition of public debate.
CONCLUSION

This elaborate elucidation of a familiar classic may allow us to
appreciate somewhat better the nature of the contradictions confronting
the Court and the centrality of free speech law in the construction of a
liberal ideological response to them. Taft and the conservatives had
identified in street conflict the arbitrary, coercive and violent elements
that had to be removed before deliberative modes of decision could be
operative. In Truax v. Corriganthey reached the high water mark of the
attempt to constitutionally mandate a remedy for such arbitrary
conduct of the streets. It is significant that although the Court split on
constitutionalizing the obligation to provide a remedy, it was unanimous on the capacity of the government to impose order on street
politics.
In a dramatic counterpoint to that development, Brandeis by 1927
had been driven to identify the law itself with force, violence, and
arbitrariness when used to silence discussion. He saw the deliberative
model of politics which justified the drive for order imposed by law as
radically circumscribing the kinds of order that "law" could impose.
Brandeis's conclusions about law itself were impossible for his brethren
to accept. Once the measured forms of law are identified with force, are
branded as illegitimate in much the same terms as picketing and street
politics; once the ideal of deliberation is understood to be as inconsistent
with a court order as with massed phalanx of men; then the resolution
or imposition of closure on major issues of the day appears to depend
upon the flimsy possibility of the agreement of all concerned.
These two opposing thrusts present, in utero, one of the major
questions for twentieth century politics. Can a polity, indeed, avoid both
forms of the "arbitrary?" Is it possible to stop the arbitrary, coercive,
violent forms of street politics without resort to the arbitrary violence of
the law? It is a measure of the distinction of the Taft Court that it had
vividly presented this dilemma to the nation and to the world. The
conservatives had resolved to accept the force of law, the voice of the
then dominant groups in the community. Justices Brandeis and Holmes,
the two oldest Justices on the Court in 1927, expressed a different faith
and a commitment to have it both ways. For them, the possibility of
restraining both private and public force demanded courage and a
dedication to public politics, to active citizenship. Citizens, in their very
132. Id. at 377-78.
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decision to participate, express a faith in their capacity to speak to one
another and to transcend ideology. This capacity is not an inherent
feature of our politics, but an achievement created by a scrupulous
"eschewing" of the arbitrary. Brandeis's answer to Walter Lippmann,
finally, is that the commitment to deliberation is a question of will.
That commitment, if it is carried out, can generate intelligence and
apply it. Ultimately, the sociology of knowledge tells us only where
people start from, not whither - through deliberation - they can bring
themselves to go.

